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Abstract
This paper shows how to design incentive-based capital requirements that
would prevent the bank from manufacturing tail risk. In the model, the senior
bank manager may have incentives to engage in tail risk. Bank shareholders
can prevent the manager from taking on tail risk via the optimal incentive
compensation contract. To induce shareholders to implement this contract,
capital requirements should internalize its costs. Moreover, bank shareholders
must be given incentives to comply with minimum capital requirements by
raising new equity and expanding bank assets. Making bank shareholders
bear the costs of compliance with capital regulation turns out to be crucial
for motivating them to care about risk-management quality in their bank.
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1 Introduction
One of the main roles of bank capital regulation is to restrain banks from excessive
risk-taking in the context of the explicit and implicit government guarantees they may
enjoy. However, the experience of the 2007-2009 financial crisis clearly shows that the
capital regulation in place failed to perform this role. This failure may be partially at-
tributed to the fact that the capital regulation framework was not adjusted in time to
the substantial changes in bank business culture brought about by new techniques in
financial engineering. One of the direct results of these changes was the emergence of tail
risk, characterized by rare but devastating losses. As pointed out by Acharya, Cooley,
Richardson and Walter (2010), top management in banks was engaged in manufacturing
tail risk in order to generate immediate profits, without regard for the long-term conse-
quences. Recent empirical evidence shows that, to a large extent, such behaviours were
caused by the perverse incentives inherent to the existing compensation schemes. Yet,
given that incentive compensation is supposed to induce managers to act in shareholders'
interests, this might suggest that bank shareholders were largely neglecting the quality
of risk management when specifying performance goals.1
In this study, I attempt to rethink the design of bank capital regulation, tailoring it to
effectively deal with the problem of "manufactured" tail risk in the banking sector. I pro-
pose an incentive-based design of capital requirements which would induce shareholders to
pay attention to the quality of risk management in their bank and to shape the incentive
compensation of a senior bank manager in such a way as to prevent him from engaging in
tail-risk strategies. To illustrate these proposals, I build a simple continuous-time model
using the principal-agent framework, in which a senior bank manager has a reversible
choice between a prudent risk management strategy and imprudent one. The imprudent
risk management strategy implies taking on tail risk and provides higher expected asset
growth rate than the prudent risk management strategy, thereby allowing the manager
to create the illusion of high performance in the short run. In addition, imprudent risk
management brings private benefits to the manager,2 which creates a potential conflict
of interests between the manager and bank shareholders, a situation further referred to
as the internal agency problem. Since the materialization of tail risk in a single bank
may incur negative externalities on the rest of the banking sector, it is assumed that
1Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) document a negative relationship between bank performance during
the crisis and the stock-option holdings of bank CEOs just before the crisis, arguing that CEOs provided
with better incentives to maximize shareholders' welfare may have taken on more risk. They conjecture
that excessive risk-taking might have been profitable for bank shareholders from an ex-ante perspective
but turned into unexpected losses ex-post. Laevin and Levin (2009) and Pathan (2009) find explicit
evidence that higher bank risk-taking is positively associated with stronger shareholders' power.
2For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the top managers of the Bank of the Commonwealth
failed in 2011 intentionally fostered the provision of bad loans in return for favors.
the regulator seeks to prevent imprudent risk management via incentive-based capital
requirements.
I begin by addressing the incentive-based design of capital requirements in the hypo-
thetical setting in which the manager acts in the interests of bank shareholders. Minimum
capital requirements in the model take the form of the regulatory threshold such that the
bank will be subject to mandatory liquidation as soon as the value of its assets falls
below this critical level. In this regard, the model shares the same feature as the exist-
ing studies dealing with incentive-based capital requirements aimed at preventing banks
from taking on higher volatility risk (see e.g. Bhattachariya, Planck, Strobl and Zechner
(2002), Décamps, Rochet and Roger (2004), Koziol and Lawrenz (2012)). A key depar-
ture from these studies is that, in the present setting, bank shareholders are given the
possibility to comply with minimum capital requirements by issuing new equity to finance
asset expansions. In fact, a sufficiently high regulatory threshold triggering immediate
liquidation can prevent a bank from taking on higher volatility risk that induces small
and frequent shocks on the bank asset value. Yet, even when set at an extremely high
level, it turns out to be unable to eliminate incentives for taking on tail risk that induces
infrequent but large negative shocks. The reason is that, if shareholders have no possi-
bility of avoiding mandatory liquidation when the bank asset value is brought down to
the regulatory threshold, the value of bank equity in the neighborhood of the regulatory
threshold becomes tiny, given that continuation perspectives are weak. As a result, bank
shareholders have almost nothing to lose in the case if the minimum capital requirements
are breached following a large loss, which induce them to "gamble for resurrection" by
implementing imprudent risk management. In other words, if bank shareholders have no
means for complying with minimum capital requirements, the desire to avoid imminent
liquidation caused by the adverse realization of volatility risk would induce taking on tail
risk.
In contrast, when bank shareholders have the possibility to comply with minimum
capital requirements via costly recapitalizations leading to asset expansion, it becomes
possible to prevent the bank from engaging in tail risk. The regulatory threshold in this
case should be designed so as to ensure that bank shareholders would prefer to undertake
costly recapitalization rather than to accept mandatory liquidation, which would rule out
the possibility to default because of adverse realizations of volatility risk. This feature
generates two incentive effects complementing each other. First, the value of equity in
the neighborhood of the regulatory threshold will remain relatively high, thereby, making
bank shareholders sensitive to the threat of mandatory liquidation if a large loss leads to
the violation of minimum capital requirements. The second incentive effect enters into
play when the bank asset value is relatively strong and the threat of breaching minimum
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capital requirements following a large loss is irrelevant. Here, shareholders will internalize
the fact that negative shocks to bank asset value under tail risk will raise the probability
of reaching minimum capital requirements, so that engaging in tail risk will entail higher
expected costs of compliance with capital regulation. Under the appropriate calibration
of the regulatory threshold, these two effects will eliminate incentives for taking on tail
risk. In the perspective of policy debates, this set of results suggests that it is not only
the level of minimum capital requirements that matters for discouraging banks from
manufacturing tail risk, but also the possibility to make bank shareholders bear the
private costs of compliance with capital regulation.
After describing the design of incentive-based capital regulation for the manager-
owned bank, I reexamine it in the context of the internal agency problem. Providing the
manager with the incentives to stick to prudent risk management is costly. If the regu-
latory threshold is not high enough, shareholders may be better off tolerating imprudent
risk management in their bank. Thus, to be able to prevent imprudent risk manage-
ment in the context of the internal agency problem, the regulatory threshold should
be designed while taking into account the shareholders' costs of the optimal incentive
compensation contract that would prevent the manager from engaging in tail risk. This
feature differentiates the proposed capital regulation design from existing capital regula-
tion approaches, which do not attach great importance to the internal agency problem
between bank shareholders and bank managers.
The optimal incentive compensation contract in this paper is derived under assump-
tion that managerial compensation is contingent on the bank asset value. This assumption
establishes the link between the size of managerial pay and the assets' size suggested by
Gabaix and Landier (2008) and helps integrate information on incentive compensation
into the capital regulation design while keeping the model tractable. Incentives to the
manager are provided by the joint use of two incentive tools: the sensitivity of com-
pensation to the changes of the bank asset value and the threat of contract termination
conditional on the arrival of a large loss. Under the optimal incentive contract, the man-
ager will never engage in tail risk and will remain in his position forever. The latter
feature is related to the fact that, unlike the existing dynamic models on optimal con-
tracting such as Sannikov (2008), He (2009) and DeMarzo, Livdan and Tchistyi (2013),
the contract continuation value remains strictly positive, regardless of the state of the
bank asset value (this is because, under the properly designed capital regulation, the bank
never ceases operating). As a result, in the case of contract termination, the manager
would have to be offered a positive terminal pay-off equal to the expected value of the
further contract payoffs he could obtain from continuation. However, this would ineffi-
ciently increase the total costs of incentive compensation to bank shareholders, so that
3
it would be optimal to keep the same manager provided no loss occurs. In the context of
this paper, this result suggests that firing the manager would be inefficient, if bank asset
value is brought down by the adverse realization of volatility risk rather than by a large
loss. At the same time, the ex-ante threat of contract termination in the case of large
losses is essential for the optimal contract design.
The nature of the moral hazard problem studied in this paper situates it close to the
work of Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2010). In their model, the agent's effort
affects a firm's exposure to tail risk, given that lower effort enables the manager to collect
private benefits proportional to the firm's size. However, they consider tail risk to be the
sole type of risk the firm faces, whereas in the present paper, bank asset value is also
affected by volatility risk. Both types of risks are present in the model of DeMarzo, Livdan
and Tchistyi (2013), who design an optimal contract in a two-dimensional setting, where
the manager privately chooses between two risk regimes, while having the possibility to
divert part of the firm's cash flow. The optimal incentive contract in their setting allows
the manager to take on tail risk when his continuation value becomes relatively low. In
the present paper, the manager controls asset growth, rather than bank assets' cash flows.
Moreover, the optimal incentive contract is designed in such a way as to discourage the
manager from taking on tail risk.
Makarov and Plantin (2012) also design the optimal incentive contract that prevents
the fund manager from taking on tail risk. However, in their model, the manager's in-
centives to take on tail risk are driven by different considerations than in the present
paper. Namely, in Makarov and Plantin (2012), managerial compensation explicitly de-
pends on the investors' perception of the manager's ability to generate excess returns,
so that taking on tail risk allows the manager to manipulate investors' beliefs about his
skills in order to receive higher awards. The optimal compensation contract in such a
framework is characterized by a sequence of random payments delivered with the intensity
depending on realized performance. In the present paper, the optimal incentive contract
is contingent on bank asset value and relies essentially on the appropriate choice of the
sensitivity of managerial compensation to the changes of bank asset value.
By incorporating information on the incentive managerial compensation into the de-
sign of capital requirements, the present paper connects the literature on the optimal
contracting in the dynamic framework with the vast capital regulation literature. How-
ever, I am not the first to point out the need to account for the internal agency problem
in the capital regulation design. Bris and Cantale (2004) placed emphasis on this issue
when examining the impact of capital requirements on the effort choice of a self-interested
risk-averse bank manager in a discrete-time framework. They find that capital regulation,
which does not take into account the internal agency problem between bank shareholders
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and the bank manager, leads to a socially-suboptimal choice of the lower level of risk. In
contrast, the present study shows that, in the context of tail risk and with risk-neutral
agents, the bank may operate at the higher level of risk if capital regulation fails to ac-
count for the internal agency problem. In addition, I explicitly show how to adapt the
optimal design of capital regulation to take account of the internal agency problem in
order to prevent socially undesirable risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies the bank's incentives to take on tail risk. Section 4 presents a bench-
mark case in which the optimal incentive capital requirements are designed in the setting
free of the internal agency problem. Section 5 reexamines the optimal design of capital
requirements, allowing for the internal agency problem. In Section 6, several related reg-
ulatory policy issues are discussed. Section 7 concludes. All proofs and technical details
are gathered in the Appendices.
2 The model
Consider a risk-neutral environment where all agents discount future cash flows at a
constant rate r. There is a bank protected by limited liability. The bank is financed by
a constant volume of insured deposits, D, and incurs continuous interest payments rD
to depositors. The bank's asset portfolio consists of non-tradable illiquid loans with an
aggregate value xt, which is assumed to be publicly observable.3 Bank assets continuously
generate a cash-flow δxtdt, so that the net payoff to shareholders after making interest
payments to depositors amounts to (δxt − rD)dt.4
The bank is run by a manager who has a reversible discretionary choice between
two risk management strategies: prudent and imprudent. Imprudent risk management
strategy generates higher expected asset growth rate µ. However, it involves infrequent
but large losses (tail risk). Large losses caused by tail risk materializing follow a Poisson
process {Nt}t≥0 with intensity λ. A large loss destroys a fraction (1 − α)xt of bank
assets, where α ∈ (0, 1) is a constant coefficient which reflects the proportion of assets
remaining after the large loss is realized. Under prudent risk management strategy, the
bank is fully protected from tail risk, but the bank asset value is growing at a lower
expected rate, (µ − ∆µ), where ∆µ > 0. For the rest of the paper, it is assumed that
∆µ ≤ λ(1 − α) and δ + (µ − ∆µ) < r. The former condition implies that imprudent
risk management is suboptimal from a social point of view. Under the latter condition,
3Following Rochet (2004) and Pennacchi (2010), I assume that the value of bank assets can be inferred
from the market value of shareholders' equity.
4Since the model does not address the optimal choice of the bank's financing structure, the tax rate
is set to zero.
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a one-dollar investment in bank assets would generally be less rewarding than a one-
dollar investment in riskless security, which makes expanding bank assets via new equity
issuance unattractive to bank shareholders.
Let st ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator of risk-management strategy implemented at time t,
where st = 0 refers to the choice of imprudent risk management. Then, bank asset value
evolves according to
dxt
xt
= (µ− st∆µ)dt+ σdZt − (1− st)(1− α)dNt, (1)
where σ is the asset return volatility and {Zt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion whose
increments reflect small and frequent shocks to the bank asset value.
Expression (1) highlights the trade-off between faster asset growth and risk man-
agement quality that many banks faced in the years prior to the global financial crisis.
Indeed, practices like aggressive subprime lending, extensive investment in structured
products, creative accounting and involvement in any kind of illegal activities may allow
the bank to benefit from higher profits in the short-run but may also lead to large losses
in the long run.5
While bank shareholders may be interested in imprudent risk management because of
the faster asset growth it may bring in the short run, the main interest for the manager to
adopt imprudent risk management relates to the possibility of collecting private benefits.
As in Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2010), private benefits are assumed to be
proportional to the asset size and amount to bxtdt per unit of time. For the reminder of
the paper, this potential divergence of bank shareholders' and manager's incentives with
respect to choice of risk-management strategy is labeled as the internal agency problem.
Since large losses incurred by a single bank may inflict negative externalities on the rest
of the economy, especially when they lead to the bank's failure, I assume that the objective
of the bank regulator is to prevent imprudent risk management by using incentive-based
capital requirements. In practice, minimum capital requirements are implemented in the
form of capital ratios, which leaves banks three possible options to comply with capital
regulation (see e.g. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2011)). These options
include (i) deleveraging through asset liquidation; (ii) issuing equity to replace debt,
while keeping the volume of assets unchanged; and (iii) raising new equity to expand
assets. Yet, the first two options might involve considerable social costs. Deleveraging
5That was the very scenario that led the Bank of the Commonwealth to its demise in 2011. Among
the more recent examples of materialized tail risk engendered by the banks themselves, one may consider
the huge fines imposed in 2014 by the U.S. Department of Justice on Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas
for implications in tax frauds and money laundering, as well as on the Bank of America for knowingly
selling bad mortgage loans to investors.
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through asset liquidation reduces lending capacity of banks, which may result in a credit
crunch and thus may harm economic growth. Moreover, massive deleveraging by banks
may draw asset prices down, which would create negative externalities for the rest of the
financial sector. In this light, changing liability structure without changing the size of the
asset portfolio may be less harmful than pure deleveraging. However, this would reduce
the supply of deposits to the economy and, thereby, cannot be considered as socially
costless. In contrast, the third option leading to asset expansion would preserve both
lending capacity and the supply of deposits.6
To leave the bank only the third option to comply with capital regulation, I assume
that minimum capital requirements are implemented in the form of a regulatory threshold
xR, such that the bank will be liquidated if the bank asset value falls below this critical
threshold. In the case of bank liquidation, the regulator will expropriate the incumbent
shareholders, restructure the bank and sell it to new owners. Thus, the incumbent share-
holders are given the following choice: to maintain bank asset value above xR, by raising
new equity and expanding assets or to be deprived of equity when not complying with
capital requirements.7
Asset expansion involves both proportional and lump-sum costs denoted by ξ1 and
ξ0 respectively. These costs comprise registration costs of new equity issues and, in
particular, asset adjustment costs. Specifically, when the fresh capital raised from bank
shareholders is used to provide loans to the creditors who previously had no lending
relationships with the bank, asset adjustment costs can be thought of as the costs of
collecting information about these new creditors, as well as transaction and negotiation
costs. Let (τn)n≥1 denote the sequence of asset expansion dates and let (zτn)n≥1 denote
the sequence of expansion factors, such that znxτn > 0 is the amount of fresh equity
capital used to expand bank assets at time τn. Then, at time t, the cumulative costs of
asset expansions will be given as follows:
It =
∑
n≥1
((1 + ξ1)zτnxτn + ξ0)1τn≤t. (2)
Notice that, in order to ensure the continuity of debt service when the asset cash-flow
does not suffice to make interest payments to depositors, i.e., δx < rD, shareholders
also have to issue new equity. However, as in the classical structural model of Leland
6One may argue that inducing bank shareholders to raise new equity in order to expand assets would
increase the bank's size and, thereby, would exacerbate the "too big to fail" problem. Yet, the fact that
a bank has attained minimum capital requirements suggests that bank assets have already substantially
shrunk, so that asset expansion would just restore the "normal" size of the bank.
7In line with the standard assumption of the structural Leland-type models, shareholders are assumed
to have "deep pockets".
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(1994), equity issuance is assumed to be costless in that case.8 This assumption is made
to put an emphasis on the fact that, when new equity is issued to service debt obligations,
the structure of bank assets remains intact, so that shareholders do not incur any asset
adjustment costs.
The possibility to comply with capital requirements via costly recapitalization leading
to asset expansion marks a key difference between the current framework and the exist-
ing structural models sharing the similar incentive-based approach to capital regulation
design (see e.g. Décamps, Rochet and Roger (2004), Rochet (2004), Koziol and Lawrenz
(2012)). The next section offers an analytical argument to account for this mechanism
when designing the incentive-based capital regulation in the context of tail risk.
3 Tail risk and capital regulation
To show the need for capital regulation in the above set-up, it is useful first to consider
the optimal risk-management strategy of the bank in the absence of capital regulation.
Throughout this section, I will abstract from the internal agency problem, analyzing risk
management decisions of the owner-managed bank.
In the absence of any regulation, bank shareholders maximize equity value, E(x),
by deciding which risk management strategy to implement conditional on the state of
the bank asset value. By the standard dynamic programming arguments, equity value
satisfies the Bellman equation:
rE(x) = max
s∈{0,1}
{1
2
σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ− s∆µ)xE ′(x)− (1− s)λ(E(x)−E(αx)) + δx− rD
}
.
(3)
The term on the left-hand side of equation (3) refers to the expected return from
holding bank equity. The first two terms on the right-hand side reflect the expected
changes in the value of equity caused by the changes in the value of the underlying
assets. The third term on the right-hand side captures the possibility of experiencing a
sudden drop in the value of equity if imprudent risk management is implemented, and
δx− rD refers to the net shareholders' profit.
Expression (3) highlights that the choice of the optimal risk management strategy is
governed by a trade-off between the instantaneous gain from imprudent risk management
and the expected loss of equity value caused by tail risk realization. Since the right-hand
side of (3) is linear in s, implementing prudent risk management is optimal as long as
8Relaxing this assumption would bring unnecessary complications in the analysis, without changing
the main findings. I verify the robustness of incentive-based capital requirements in the presence of such
a type of equity issuance costs in Appendix D.
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the expected negative jump of equity value caused by tail risk realization exceeds the
marginal increase in equity value generated by imprudent risk management, i.e.,
λ(E(x)− E(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x). (4)
Condition (4) will be further referred to as the incentive compatibility condition of
bank shareholders. Assume that this condition always holds in the absence of any regu-
latory control so that the bank would forever stick to prudent risk management. Under
condition δ + (µ − ∆µ) < r, an increase in the value of equity generated by asset ex-
pansion would be always less than the value of capital injected by shareholders, even if
the costs related to asset expansions were zero.9 As a result, bank shareholders would
never raise new equity in order to finance asset expansions and would close the bank, as
soon as the bank asset value attains a certain liquidation threshold x∗L chosen so as to
maximize the value of equity. Plugging s = 1 into the ODE (3) and solving the latter
under the boundary condition E(x∗L) = 0 and no-bubble condition lim
x→∞
E(x)→ δx− rD
would yield the following expression for equity value:
E(x) = νδx−D + (D − νδx∗L)
(
x
x∗L
)β2
, (5)
where β2 < 0 is a negative root of characteristic equation 1/2σ2β(β − 1) + µβ = r
associated with the ODE (3), ν = (r − µ+ ∆µ)−1 and the optimal default threshold x∗L
(such that ∂E(x)/∂x∗L = 0) is given by
x∗L =
β2
β2 − 1
D
νδ
. (6)
Yet, given the value of equity defined in (5), verification of the incentive compatibility
condition of bank shareholders shows that the latter is violated in the neighborhood of the
optimal liquidation threshold x∗L. Thus, the following result is obtained by contradiction.
Proposition 1 In the absence of any regulatory control, sticking forever to prudent risk
management is never optimal for bank shareholders.
Indeed, distressed banks may have incentives to "gamble for resurrection", optimally
engaging in tail risk in order to increase asset growth and, thereby, to delay liquidation.
In such a context, capital regulation is needed in order to prevent the bank from engaging
in tail risk.
9Formally, this is captured by condition E′(x) < 1, which can be easily verified by using the ex-
pression of equity value provided in (5). Indeed, one can observe that lim
x→x∗L
E′(x) → 0, E′′(x) > 0 and
lim
x→∞E
′(x)→ νδ < 1.
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Before the recent financial crisis revealed the acute problem of "manufactured" tail
risk in the banking sector, one of the central themes of the literature on bank capital
regulation has been the asset substitution problem. This problem refers to the bank
owners' incentives to pick assets with higher volatility risk, without regard for the negative
externalities related to such a choice. A number of papers dealing with this issue in the
context of Leland-type structural models10 showed that it is possible to prevent a bank
from choosing assets with higher volatility risk, σ, through an incentive-based regulatory
threshold, such that shareholders have no choice but to face mandatory liquidation as
soon as the bank asset value hits this regulatory threshold. The natural question is
whether a simple threat of mandatory liquidation is sufficient to prevent the bank from
engaging in tail risk.
Assume for a moment that expanding bank assets via new equity injections is pro-
hibitively costly and consider any arbitrary regulatory liquidation threshold xL ≥ x∗L.
Once again, verification of the incentive compatibility condition (4) shows that the latter
doesn't hold when bank asset value approaches xL. This is because, in the neighborhood
of the liquidation threshold, the value of equity becomes too weak, so that the expected
benefits from taking on tail risk would outweigh the expected loss of equity value caused
by the realization of a large loss. Namely, taking on tail risk may help the distressed bank
to increase asset growth and, thereby, to avoid imminent liquidation caused by adverse
realizations of volatility risk. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 If shareholders have no choice but to face mandatory liquidation when
bank asset value hits the regulatory threshold following adverse realizations of volatility
risk, capital regulation would be unable to discourage the bank from taking on tail risk.
Proposition 2 stipulates that a mere increase in capital requirements will be insuf-
ficient to deal with "manufactured" tail risk in the banking sector if bank shareholders
have no means of avoiding mandatory liquidation upon reaching the regulatory threshold.
As will be shown below, the incentives to take on tail risk can be eliminated if (i) bank
shareholders have the possibility to ensure compliance with capital requirements by is-
suing new equity and expanding bank assets, and (ii) minimum capital requirements are
designed in such a way so as to induce them to use this possibility rather than to accept
mandatory liquidation. The intuition is that, when bank shareholders have incentives
to undertake costly asset expansions in order to comply with capital requirements, the
possibility to default because of adverse realizations of volatility risk is ruled out. As a
result, the value of bank equity in the neighborhood of the regulatory threshold would
10See e.g. Bhattachariya, Planck, Strobl and Zechner (2002), Décamps, Rochet and Roger (2004),
Koziol and Lawrenz (2012).
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remain relatively high, and bank shareholders would have "something to lose" in the case
that a large loss brings bank asset value below the regulatory threshold. In addition, even
when bank asset value is relatively strong (so that the threat of mandatory liquidation
in the case of a large loss is irrelevant), shareholders will internalize the fact that neg-
ative shocks to bank asset value will increase the frequency of hitting minimum capital
requirements, thereby raising the total expected costs of asset expansions. Under the
appropriate calibration of the regulatory threshold, these two effects can discourage the
bank from engaging in tail risk. The next two sections take a detailed look at the design
of incentive-based regulatory threshold, allowing for the possibility of a costly compliance
with minimum capital requirements.
4 Capital regulation for the owner-managed bank
In order to track the impact of the internal agency problem on capital regulation,
I start by looking into the design of incentive-based capital requirements in a setting,
where the interests of the bank manager are perfectly aligned with the interests of bank
shareholders. In what follows, I will refer to this setting as the benchmark case.
Consider the regulatory problem. The regulator is looking for the optimal regulatory
threshold xR which will induce the bank to stick to prudent risk management for all
x ≥ xR while maximizing bank social value, V (x). Bank social value is equal to the sum
of bank equity value and the market value of deposits net of any social costs φ(x) related
to bank liquidation or any regulatory measures, i.e., V (x) = E(x) + D − φ(x). Due to
deposit insurance, the market value of deposits is constant over time. At the same time,
under reasonable costs of asset expansions (for the rest of the analysis, I stick to this
scenario), there will be no bank liquidation ex-post, so that φ(x) ≡ 0. As a result, under
the condition that the bank will stick to prudent risk management, the maximization of
bank social value will be equivalent to the maximization of bank equity value.11
Determining the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold requires knowledge of
the optimal decisions that will be made by bank shareholders in response to capital
regulation. Indeed, faced with minimum capital requirements implemented in the form
of the regulatory threshold, bank shareholders will decide: (i) whether to comply with
capital requirements via costly asset expansions or just accept mandatory liquidation
when breaching the regulatory threshold? (ii) if the first alternative is better, how much
equity must be issued to finance asset expansion? (iii) which risk-management technology
11It is worthwhile mentioning that the regulatory problem wouldn't change if bank liabilities were to
comprise uninsured debt. In fact, under incentive-based capital requirements, the bank will never default
and uninsured debt will be risk free.
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should be implemented depending on the state of the bank asset value?
As was discussed in the previous section, in the absence of capital regulation, bank
shareholders can optimally choose when to liquidate the bank. Hence, under condition
δ + (µ−∆µ) < r, undertaking costly asset expansions would not make any sense. How-
ever, under minimum capital requirements, the bank is faced with a threat of premature
liquidation, so that the asset-expansion option might be used to avoid it. Whether com-
pliance with capital requirements via asset expansions dominates liquidation depends on
the costs of asset expansion and the level of the regulatory threshold. As will become
apparent from the analysis below, asset expansion is valuable for shareholders when the
proportional costs of asset expansion are relatively low and the regulatory threshold is
relatively high.
Given condition δ+(µ−∆µ) < r and the fixed costs of asset expansions, it is reasonable
to conjecture that bank shareholders will not undertake asset expansions as long as the
bank asset value exceeds the regulatory threshold (this conjecture will be verified ex-
post). Thus, unless mandatory liquidation dominates costly asset expansion, the optimal
strategy of bank shareholders will be to finance asset expansions by raising new equity
zxR whenever the bank asset value hits the regulatory threshold xR. Furthermore, the
asset expansion factor, z, will be selected so as to maximize the value of the shareholders'
claim.
Finally, bank shareholders would forever stick to prudent risk management under
condition:
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x), x ≥ xR, (7)
which is obtained by the immediate adaptation of the incentive compatibility condition
(4), resulting from the maximization problem of bank shareholders. Here, the indicator
function 1x≥xR/α reflects the fact that a large loss incurred in the region [xR, xR/α) would
trigger bank liquidation.
Taking into account the above considerations, the regulatory problem can be stated
as follows:
max
xR>0,z>0
E(x) ≥ 0 subject to (7).
In the above problem, equity value represents the expected discounted value of future
operating profits net of the total costs of asset expansions:
E(xt) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(δxτ − rD)dτ −
∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)dIτ
]
, (8)
where xt follows (1) with st = 1 and Iτ is given by (2) with xτn = xR, zτn = z for any
given τn ≤ t. As shown in Appendix A.1, one can obtain a simple closed-form expression
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for the value of equity:
E(x) = νδx−D − Ω(xR, z)xβ2 , (9)
where
Ω(xR, z) =
[
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ)zxR
1− (1 + z)β2
]
xR
−β2 > 0.
To gain some intuition on the solution to the regulatory problem, observe that max-
imizing equity value is actually equivalent to minimizing the expected costs of compli-
ance with capital regulation reflected by Ω(xR, z). Given any arbitrary expansion factor
z > 0, consider the choice of the optimal incentive-compatible regulatory threshold. Since
Ω(xR, z) is increasing with xR, the maximum equity value will be attained under the min-
imum feasible incentive-based regulatory threshold that makes the incentive constraint
(7) binding at x = xR. Plugging equity value (9) into the binding incentive constraint
(7) and solving the obtained equation with respect to xR yields a simple analytical char-
acterization of the optimal regulatory threshold which would deter the owner-managed
bank from taking on tail risk:12
xBR(z) =
h0(z)
h1(z)
, (10)
where the expressions for h0(z) and h1(z) are provided in Appendix B.
Given the regulatory threshold xBR(z), the expected loss of equity value under tail risk
exposure would always exceed the instantaneous gain from imprudent risk management,
which will induce the bank to stick to prudent risk management. Moreover, it can be veri-
fied that, irrespective of the chosen asset expansion factor z, equity value remains strictly
positive at xBR(z), so that, at this point, shareholders will prefer to undertake costly asset
expansion rather than face mandatory liquidation. At the same time, faced with the reg-
ulatory threshold xBR(z), shareholders will have no interest in undertaking voluntary asset
expansions at any x > xBR(z), since the costs of asset expansions would always exceed the
expected growth of equity value that would result from capital injections.
It is shown in the Appendix that xBR(z) > 0 exists if and only if the proportional costs
of asset expansion do not exceed a certain critical level ξ1(z).
13 Let
z∗ = arg min Ω(xBR(z), z)
12The model framework can also accommodate the presence of the proportional equity issuance costs
when new equity is issued to ensure interest payments to depositors for x < rD/δ (see Appendix D).
In this case, it is still possible to prevent tail risk by using of the incentive-based regulatory threshold
which makes the incentive constraint of bank shareholders binding. The robustness of this result hinges
on the concavity of the equity value function.
13At the same time, the existence of the solution to the regulatory problem does not depend on the
magnitude of the fixed costs of asset expansion, ξ0. From the complete expression of x
B
R(z) provided
in the Appendix B, one can easily see that, for any level of ξ0, there exists a corresponding minimum
incentive-based regulatory threshold.
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denote the asset expansion factor maximizing the bank equity value constructed under the
incentive-based regulatory threshold xBR(z). Then, the optimal design of incentive-based
capital regulation in the absence of the internal agency problem can be characterized as
follows:
Proposition 3 When the proportional costs of asset expansions are relatively low, i.e.,
ξ1 < ξ1(z
∗), the regulator can prevent the bank from engaging in tail risk via the optimal
regulatory threshold
xBR(z
∗) =
h0(z
∗)
h1(z∗)
,
such that the bank will be subject to liquidation if the value of its assets falls below xBR(z
∗).
The incentive power of the proposed capital regulation design is anchored in the two ef-
fects related to the fact that xBR(z
∗) is constructed in such a way that shareholders will find
it optimal to undertake costly asset expansions upon reaching the regulatory threshold.
First, the possibility of complying with minimum capital requirements via costly asset
expansions prevents the value of equity from being too weak when the value of underlying
assets is relatively low. This makes bank shareholders sensitive to the threat of mandatory
liquidation conditioned on the arrival of a large loss in the region [xBR(z
∗), xBR(z
∗)/α).14
Second, when bank asset value is relatively strong and the threat of mandatory liquida-
tion in the case of a large loss is irrelevant, i.e, x ≥ xBR(z∗)/α, another incentive effect is
activated. Here, shareholders will internalize the fact that, under large losses caused by
imprudent risk management, the bank asset value would deteriorate more quickly, which
would increase the likelihood of reaching the regulatory threshold and, thereby, would
amplify the expected costs of compliance with minimum capital requirements.15 Thus,
it turns out that making bank shareholders bear the costs of compliance with capital
regulation is essential for inducing them to stay away from imprudent risk management.
As suggested by Admati, Conti-Brown and Pfleiderer (2012), in practice, this might be
achieved by creating equity-funded Liability Holding Companies, which would support
the increased liability of systemically important banks' equity.
To get an idea about the order of magnitude of the optimal incentive-based capital
requirements, I resort to numerical examples. The values of the model parameters are set
14In contrast, if the proportional costs of asset expansions are too high or the regulatory threshold
is low, bank shareholders would have no incentives to undertake costly asset expansions. As a result,
bank equity value would be weak in the neighborhood of the regulatory threshold, so that the benefits of
imprudent risk management would outweigh the expected loss of equity value. As shown by Proposition
2, it would be impossible to eliminate incentives for taking on tail risk in this case.
15The long-run impact of capital adjustment costs cannot be captured by a static model, which may
explain the divergence of the obtained results with that of Perotti, Ratnovski and Vlahu (2011) who find
that tighter capital regulation may induce the bank to take on tail risk even in the presence of capital
adjustment costs.
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as follows: the volume of deposits is normalized to one, the risk-free interest rate r = 4%,
the asset return volatility σ = 20%, the expected asset growth rate under imprudent risk
management µ = 2.5%, the expected asset growth rate under prudent risk management
(µ −∆µ) = 2%, the cash-flow rate δ = 1.9%, the intensity of large losses λ = 0.15, the
residual fraction of assets after a large loss α = 0.9, proportional costs of asset expansion
ξ1 ∈ [1%, 10%] and lump-sum costs of asset expansion ξ0 ∈ [0.1× 10−4, 0.1× 10−3]. This
parameter set is calibrated for the exposure to 10 percent losses occurring on average
once every 6-7 years. Parameters µ, ∆µ and δ are set to comply with assumptions
∆µ ≤ λ(1 − α) and δ + (µ − ∆µ) < r. The proportional costs of asset expansion vary
in the range reflecting the existing empirical evidence on the average marginal costs of
equity issuance.16 The fixed costs of asset expansions are controlled to not exceed 10%
of the capital injection.
In this numerical example, the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold xBR(z
∗)
varies in the range of (1.15, 1.25), and the optimal asset expansion factor z∗ takes values
between (0.01, 0.03). For example, for ξ0 = 0.1×10−3 and ξ1 = 0.05, one obtain xBR(z∗) ≈
1.1912 and z∗ ≈ 0.0263, which would correspond to the minimum capital ratio of 16%
and 2.6% asset growth resulted from asset expansion.17
Comparative statics results reported in Appendix C show that the optimal regulatory
threshold xBR(z
∗) is increasing on both fixed and proportional costs of asset expansions.
Indeed, under the significant costs related to asset expansions, continuation should be
valuable enough to induce shareholders to prefer a costly asset expansion over bank liq-
uidation. The choice of the optimal expansion factor z∗ is governed by the interplay
between two opposite effects generated by the fixed and proportional costs of asset ex-
pansions: z∗, as well as the optimal scale of asset expansion, z∗xBR(z
∗), is increasing on ξ0
and decreasing on ξ1. Indeed, higher fixed costs induce shareholders to undertake larger
asset expansions in order to build stronger capital buffer and thus to delay the next event
of costly asset expansion, whereas higher proportional costs reduce the shareholders' ca-
pacity of asset expansions. Lastly, it can be mentioned that the optimal regulatory rule
xBR(z
∗) is increasing with asset return volatility σ, since higher σ exacerbates incentives
to take on tail risk. At the same time, xBR(z
∗) decreases with the intensity of large losses
λ. Indeed, for any given ∆µ, higher intensity of large losses would reduce shareholders'
incentives for engaging in tail risk, thereby allowing for less stringent capital requirements.
Before turning to the design of the capital regulation under the internal agency prob-
16For example, the average marginal equity issuance costs are estimated at 2.8% in Gomes (2001),
5.1% in Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000), 10.7% for small firms and 5% for large firms in Hennessy and
Whited (2007).
17In the current framework, the minimum capital ratio coincides with the leverage ratio and can be
computed as the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets: 100%× (xBR(z∗)−D)/xBR(z∗).
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lem, it would be useful to discuss one caveat that refers to the rigid payout policy inherited
from the seminal structural model of Leland (1994). Yet, intuition suggests that, instead
of sticking to a rigid payout policy, bank shareholders might be better off reinvesting a
fraction of the asset cash-flow in order to increase the expected asset growth rate and thus
to reduce the probability of hitting the regulatory threshold triggering costly asset expan-
sion. Indeed, numerous numerical experiments show that E ′(x) > 1 when x → xBR(z∗).
Thus, because of the aversion to costly asset expansions, shareholders may be willing
to reinvest a fraction of the asset cash-flow when approaching the regulatory threshold.
This is actually the concavity of the equity value function coupled with the presence of
the regulatory constraint that suggests the relevance of the endogenous payout policy.18
To sharpen the analysis, in the Appendix E, I build an extended version of the
benchmark-case model that accommodates the above considerations. To handle the en-
dogenous payout decisions while preserving the main properties of the process driving the
bank asset value, I follow Diamond and He (2014), by presuming that bank sharehold-
ers have an option to reinvest a part of the asset cash-flow at a constant rate, without
incurring any fixed asset adjustment costs. Reinvestment, however, may involve some
proportional deadweight costs, which would reduce the effective reinvestment rate. The
numerical analysis conducted for this version of the model delivers a number of inter-
esting predictions. First, it confirms that shareholders would find it optimal to use the
reinvestment option only when the bank is in a deep distress. Therefore, it is the very
aversion to the costs of compliance with minimum capital requirements that can induce
shareholders to hedge against the consequences of the adverse realization of volatility risk
by scarifying dividend payments (or raising additional equity to ensure the continuity of
debt service) in order to increase the expected asset growth rate. Second, the higher
deadweight costs of reinvestment would raise the need for tighter capital regulation.19
In fact, instead of undertaking reinvestment that involves deadweight costs, bank share-
holders may obtain the desired increase in the expected asset growth rate by engaging
in tail risk. Higher deadweight costs of reinvestment would make the second alternative
more attractive to shareholders, so that a higher regulatory threshold should be imposed
to offset these perverse incentives. Finally, I use this extended version of the model in
order to explore the implications of the additional regulatory measure that would re-
18In this respect, the present model substantially differs from the classical structural model of Leland
(1994), in which shareholders optimally choose when to liquidate the firm. Because of the optimal choice
of the liquidation threshold, the first derivative of the shareholders' claim in the Leland's model never
exceeds one, thereby, making reinvestment suboptimal.
19For relatively high levels of the deadweight costs, reinvestment would be suboptimal, so that the
design of the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold would be exactly the same as described in
Proposition 3.
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strict payouts to shareholders below a certain critical level of the bank assets value.20
Interestingly, restricting payouts to shareholders turns out to be counterproductive: the
numerical analysis reveals that constraining payouts at a higher level of the bank assets
value would require raising the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold. The rea-
son is that tighter payout restrictions would reduce the bank's franchise value, thereby,
weakening the shareholders' incentives to inject capital into the bank in order to ensure
compliance with minimum capital requirements. This would in turn exacerbate the share-
holders' incentives for taking on tail risk and thus would raise the need for tighter capital
requirements. Put differently, this result suggests that regulatory interventions into the
bank's payout policy, when the bank is subject to moral hazard regarding the choice of
risk management quality, may undermine the stability of the banking sector, unless they
are not complemented by stricter capital regulation.
5 Capital regulation under the internal agency prob-
lem
Consider now the set-up which allows for the internal agency problem. Here, sharehold-
ers have to make two strategic decisions: (i) whether to promote prudent risk management
in their bank and (ii) if so, how to create the appropriate incentives for the manager at
minimum cost. I start by answering the second question, defining the optimal incentive
contract with the manager. Then I use information on the optimal incentive contract to
design the optimal incentive regulatory threshold, which will induce shareholders to put
this contract in place.
5.1 The optimal incentive contract
Assume there exists some incentive regulatory threshold xR under which sharehold-
ers find it optimal to promote prudent risk management in their bank for all x ≥ xR.
Then, what will be the incentive contract inducing the manager to stick to prudent risk
management at a minimum cost to bank shareholders?
A contract offered to the manager can be characterized by a triple {xT , R(x), RT},
where xT denotes a contract termination rule, R(x) ≥ 0 is an asset-based remuneration
defined for each x ≥ xT and RT ≥ 0 is a lump-sum terminal pay-off delivered at the
contract termination date. I restrict the analysis to the class of affine contracts, looking
20For example, under Basel III, dividend restrictions are imposed on the banks that fail to maintain
capital conservation buffers.
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for asset-based remuneration in the following form:
R(x) = w1x+ w0, (11)
which potentially allows for the variable and fixed compensation components.
Given that materialization of tail risk will make the choice of management technology
verifiable ex-post, the contract implies an additional condition: the manager will be fired
without any terminal pay if a large loss occurs. The threat of being fired after a large loss
represents a maximum feasible punishment under the limited liability of the manager,
enabling shareholders to avoid inefficient costs of incentive provision.
Consider the manager's choice between prudent and imprudent risk management.
Given any contract {xT , R(x), RT}, the manager maximizes contract continuation value,
W (x), which is contingent on bank asset value and represents the current expected value
of total future contract payoffs, including any private benefits:
max
sτ∈{0,1}
W (xt) = E
[∫ τ∧T
t
e−r(τ−t)(R(xτ ) + (1− sτ )bxτ )dτ + e−r(T−t)RT
]
, (12)
where xτ follows (1) and T = inf{t ≥ 0 : xt ≤ xT}.
By the standard dynamic programming arguments, the optimal contract continuation
value satisfies
rW (x) = max
s∈{0,1}
{1
2
σ2x2W ′′(x)+(µ−s∆µ)W ′(x)+R(x)+(1−s)(bx−λW (x))
}
. (13)
As shown by (13), imprudent risk management has an ambiguous effect on the man-
ager's wealth. On the one hand, it boosts contract continuation value by increasing the
expected asset return and allowing the manager to collect private benefits. On the other
hand, the manager risks losing his position (and, consequently, the expected value of
further payoffs) with probability λdt in a short period of time dt. As long as the expected
loss of contract continuation value under tail-risk exposure, λW (x), exceeds the instan-
taneous gain from imprudent risk management, ∆µxW ′(x) + bx, the manager will stick
to prudent risk management.
Assume that replacing the manager is costless.21 Let (Tm)m≥1 denote the sequence
of contract termination dates and let SC(xt) denote the expected value of the total
shareholders' costs of managerial compensation evaluated at time t:
SC(xt) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)R(xτ )dτ +
∑
m≥1
e−r(Tm−t)RT
]
. (14)
21Allowing for the cost of managerial turnover would not affect the optimal contract design.
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Then, for any xt > xR, the optimization problem of bank shareholders can be stated
as follows:
min
xT≥xR,w1,w0,RT≥0
SC(x)
s.t.
λW (x) ≥ ∆µxW ′(x) + bx, (15)
w1x+ w0 ≥ 0, (16)
W (x) ≥ 0, (17)
where W (x) is given by (12) with sτ = 1.
Condition (15) is the incentive compatibility constraint resulting from the manager's
maximization problem (12). Condition (16) reflects the limited liability of the manager.
Finally, condition (17) stands for the individual rationality constraint.
It is shown in Appendix B that the incentive constraint (15) holds for all x ≥ xR, if
the following condition is satisfied:22
w1ν(λ−∆µ)x ≥ bx− λw0/r, ∀x ≥ xR. (18)
Let w∗1 denote the minimum incentive-compatible sensitivity of managerial compen-
sation to the changes of the bank's asset value:
w∗1 =
b
ν(λ−∆µ) . (19)
For any given w0, the minimum shareholders' costs of incentive provision would be
ensured by w1(w0) that makes constraint (18) binding at xR:
w1(w0) = w
∗
1 −
λ
ν(λ−∆µ)
w0
r
1
xR
. (20)
It is easy to see that w1(w0) ≥ w∗1 if and only if w0 ≤ 0. Given w1(w0) defined by
(20), it can be shown that the total expected shareholders' costs of incentive provision are
decreasing with w0. Thus, it is optimal to set w0 = 0, keeping compensation sensitivity
w1 to a minimum.23
To define the optimal termination rule and the optimal terminal payoff, I compare the
minimum value of shareholders' costs under two options. The first option implies xT = xR,
22This condition can be interpreted as the incentive compatibility condition (15) rewritten for the
perpetual contract continuation value, w1ν + w0/r.
23Alternatively, one could obtain the same result by considering the minimum incentive-compatible
w0(w1) as a function of compensation sensitivity w1 > w
∗
1 and then minimizing the total shareholders'
costs of incentive provision over w1.
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so that the manager will be replaced when bank asset value hits the regulatory threshold;
the second option implies xT = ∅, meaning that the manager will be allowed to keep his
position forever if no loss occurs. I show in Appendix B that, faced with termination rule
xT = xR, the manager has to be provided with a strictly positive terminal payoff equal to
the expected value of the further contract payoffs he could obtain from continuation; i.e.,
RT = W (xR). Conversely, letting the manager stay forever provided that no loss occurs
would allow shareholders to avoid these payments. Put differently, this result suggests
that firing the manager when the bank asset value is brought down to the regulatory
threshold by volatility risk (and not by a large loss) would be inefficient.24
Proposition 4 The optimal incentive contract which will induce prudent risk manage-
ment at minimum cost to shareholders is characterized by incentive remuneration R∗(x) =
w∗1x for all x ≥ xR. The manager is never fired provided no loss occurs; i.e., x∗T = ∅ and
R∗T = ∅.
Under the optimal incentive contract, the manager will stick to prudent risk manage-
ment and thus will never be forced to step down. Then, the total shareholders' costs of
incentive provision will coincide with the minimum incentive-compatible contract contin-
uation value for the manager:
SC∗(x) ≡ W ∗(x) = w∗1ν
(
x+
zxR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
. (21)
5.2 The optimal incentive capital requirements
Given the optimal incentive contract with the manager, it becomes possible to address
the design of capital regulation in the context of the internal agency problem. The regula-
tor is now looking for the optimal regulatory threshold xR, which will induce shareholders
to promote prudent risk management in their bank by implementing the optimal incen-
tive compensation contract defined in Proposition 4. Let EW ∗(x) denote equity value
that accounts for the costs of the optimal incentive compensation:
EW ∗(x) = E(x)−W ∗(x) = ν(δ − w∗1)x−D − Ωw(xR, z)xβ2 , (22)
where
Ωw(xR, z) =
[
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − ν(δ − w∗1))zxR
1− (1 + z)β2
]
xR
−β2 > 0.
24A contract with infinite duration, however, might be inappropriate for the setting in which the
manager can control both tail risk exposure and asset volatility. In fact, increasing σ in the neighborhood
of the regulatory threshold would increase the probability of asset expansion, which would allow the
manager to benefit from higher compensation awards. A design of the optimal incentive compensation
under such a bi-dimensional moral hazard problem is suggested for further research.
20
Then, the regulatory problem can be stated as follows:
max
xR>0,z>0
EW ∗(x) ≥ 0 s.t.
λ(EW ∗(x)− 1x≥xR/αEW ∗(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′W ∗(x) + w∗1x for ∀x ≥ xR, (23)
where x follows (1) with s = 1 and w∗1 is given by (19).
The above problem is similar to the one defined in the benchmark case. The only
difference comes from the fact that the real costs of prudent risk management to bank
shareholders are amplified by the costs of the incentive compensation which has to be of-
fered to the manager. Then, the optimal regulatory threshold can be obtained in the same
way as in the benchmark case. In particular, for any given expansion factor z, one can
identify the minimum feasible regulatory threshold xAR(z) that would preclude imprudent
risk management (it results from the binding incentive compatibility constraint of bank
shareholders). Next, the optimal asset expansion factor z∗∗ = arg min Ωw(xAR(z), z)
should be chosen so as to maximize equity value constructed under xAR(z). Finally, plug-
ging z∗∗ into the expression of xAR(z) would yield the value of the optimal incentive-based
regulatory threshold. Solving the regulatory problem in this way leads to the following
result.
Proposition 5 In the presence of the internal agency problem, the regulator can prevent
the bank from engaging in tail risk via the optimal regulatory threshold
xAR(z
∗∗) =
h0(z
∗∗)
h1(z∗∗)− w∗1h2(z∗∗)
, where h2(z
∗∗) > 0, 25
such that the bank will be subject to liquidation if the value of its assets falls below xAR(z
∗∗).
It is worth noting that the above proposition is relevant if and only if h1(z)−w∗1h2(z) >
0, which implies that both the proportional costs of asset expansion and the size-adjusted
private benefits that the manager can generate when taking on tail risk have to be rela-
tively low.
In can be easily noticed that, given the same expansion factor z, the optimal incentive
regulatory threshold obtained under the internal agency problem exceeds that obtained
in the benchmark case; i.e., xAR(z) > x
B
R(z). This suggests that capital regulation, which
does not internalize the costs of the internal agency problem between bank shareholders
and bank managers, would be unable to deter banks from engaging in tail risk.26 Thus,
25The expression for h2(z) is provided in Appendix B.
26In the light of this theoretical result, it would be interesting to conduct an empirical investigation
of whether the banks facing the same level of capital charges but differing in the degree of the internal
agency problem exhibit heterogeneity in the realization of large losses.
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the internal agency problem matters and should be taken into account by bank regulators
when designing capital regulation.
Solving the above problem numerically shows that the optimal regulatory threshold
xAR(z
∗∗) increases with the degree of the internal agency problem reflected by the size-
adjusted private benefits b (see Appendix C, Panel C.5). In terms of policy implications,
this result suggests that the banks exposed to the more severe internal agency problem
related to risk management should be faced with higher minimum capital requirements.
Indeed, the more acute is the internal agency problem, the more substantial will be
the costs of the incentive contract that must be offered to the manager. This would
erode the value of shareholders' claim, thereby, weakening the shareholders' incentives
to promote prudent risk-management and to keep the bank operating upon breaching
minimum capital requirements. As a result, strengthening capital requirements is needed
in order to preserve the incentive mechanism.
6 Discussion
This section is devoted to the discussion of several regulatory policy issues aimed at
improving the risk-management culture in the banking sector. I start by examining the
impact of bonus taxes on risk management. Then I consider the proposals to impose
explicit control over managerial compensation. Finally, I discuss the trade-off between
capital requirements and insurance protection as a potential risk mitigation tool.
6.1 Bonus taxes and risk management
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis, several European countries (UK,
France, Italy) introduced a tax on the performance bonuses of bank top management.
One of the official purposes of this measure was to improve the risk-management culture
in the banking sector. The model developed in this paper can be used to examine the
effect of bonus taxes on shareholders' incentives to promote prudent risk management in
their bank.
Let a tax rate τ be applied to asset-based incentive compensation R(x). Assume first
that taxes are paid by bank shareholders. In this case, bonus taxes have no impact on the
manager's incentives, and thus bank shareholders can induce prudent risk management
by using the same optimal incentive contract as in a tax-free world. However, the total
shareholders' costs of creating incentives will be increased by the amount of taxes and will
be equal to (1 + τ)W ∗(x), where W ∗(x) is defined by (21). Consider now the alternative
setting, where bonus taxes are paid by the bank manager. To be motivated to stick to
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prudent risk management, the manager should have at least the same level of wealth after
the tax levy as in a tax-free world. Then, the minimum incentive contract continuation
value that should be offered to the manager will be given by 1/(1− τ)W ∗(x).
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that bonus taxes are
inappropriate for dealing with excessive risk-taking in banks. Under both scenarios, they
increase the real shareholders' costs of promoting prudent risk management and thus
would lead to a situation requiring tougher capital regulation. It is also easy to see that
total shareholders' costs of creating incentives when bonus taxes are paid by the manager
would be higher than when bonus taxes are paid by the shareholders themselves. Thus,
the lesser of two evils would be to collect bonus taxes from bank shareholders rather than
from bank managers, which is consistent with the practices adopted in UK and France
in 2009-2010.
6.2 Implicit vs explicit regulation of managerial pay
Following the recent empirical evidence suggesting that, in the years preceding the
2007-2009 financial crisis, the existing compensation schemes exacerbated risk-taking in-
centives in the banking sector,27 certain academic studies, such as Bebchuk and Spamann
(2010) and Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010), advocate for introducing regulatory con-
trol over executive compensation. However, exercising explicit control over executive
compensation might be problematic. The first problem is that regulators do not dispose
of all of the information needed for the efficient design and enforcement of executive
compensation. Second, it is still unclear what form the optimal incentive compensation
structure should take. Finally, experience shows that economic agents always find a way
to get around regulations if their incentives diverge from regulatory purposes. Given that
shareholders originally have higher risk appetite than managers, explicitly regulating ex-
ecutive pay without regulating shareholders' incentives would probably be a waste of
regulatory resources. These reasons argue for implicit control over managerial incentives.
The detailed design of managerial compensation should be left to bank shareholders,
whereas the role of the bank regulator is to ensure that shareholders have sufficient in-
centives to pay due attention to the quality of risk management in their banks.
6.3 Insurance policy and capital requirements
The last relevant question I discuss here is whether capital requirements should be
reduced if a bank acquires an insurance policy against tail risk. Actually, only the ad-
vanced approach of the Basel capital regulation framework considers an insurance policy
27See e.g. Chen et al. (2006), Cheng et al. (2010), DeYoung et al. (2013).
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as a risk mitigation tool and authorizes banks holding such policies to operate with re-
duced mandatory capital. However, it seems that greater reliance on insurance protection
may aggravate the problem of moral hazard. The point is that an insurance policy al-
lows banks to transfer risk without tackling it at the source; i.e., it helps to reallocate
risks but it cannot prevent their accumulation within the financial system. Moreover, in
the context of a systemic crisis, insurance companies themselves may experience serious
financial problems, being therefore unable to provide loss coverage.28 Thus, even though
recourse to insurance may be beneficial for bank shareholders (i.e. it might be cheaper
to buy an insurance policy than to create appropriate incentives for the manager), pru-
dent risk management would be the only durable solution from the perspective of social
welfare. Banks can be allowed to buy insurance protection against some external risks
such as external fraud, hacking attacks, and natural disasters, since insurance protection
will not promote moral hazard and risk accumulation in this case. At the same time,
regulators should induce banks to tackle the sources of internal risk. As shown in this
paper, this can be realized by means of the incentive-based capital requirements which
internalize the optimal recapitalization decisions of bank shareholders as well as the costs
of resolving the internal agency problem.
7 Conclusion
This paper attempts to rethink the approach to bank capital regulation in response to
the huge incentive distortions revealed by the 2007-09 financial crisis. The incentive-based
design of capital requirements proposed here is aimed at dealing with "manufactured" tail
risk in the banking sector. This paper shows how to design capital requirements which
would induce bank shareholders to care about the quality of risk management in their
banks and put in place an incentive compensation scheme that will deter bank managers
from engaging in tail risk.
Two features are crucial for the design of capital requirements to produce the required
incentive effect. First, since merely increasing capital requirements may not prevent
banks from engaging in tail risk, capital regulation should be designed in such a way so
as to induce bank shareholders to undertake costly asset expansions in order to comply
with minimum capital requirements. The choice of making bank shareholders bear the
private costs of compliance with capital regulation appears to be crucial for giving them
incentives to pay attention to risk management strategies adopted by the management.
Second, the design of minimum capital requirements should account for the internal
28This happened to AIG, one of the biggest players on the world insurance market, which was bailed
out by the Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury in 2008.
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agency problem between bank shareholders and bank managers. Since the internal agency
problem makes it costly for bank shareholders to promote prudent risk-taking behavior
by bank managers, bank shareholders should be required to maintain a larger stake in
the game. This might be viewed as justification for more stringent capital requirements
for systemically important banks, which typically exhibit both severe agency problems
and higher propensity to manufacture tail risk. Overall, the proposed approach to bank
capital regulation would help to avoid costly bank liquidations, removing the incentives
for "manufacturing" tail risk. Moreover, it would allow bank regulators to implicitly
control the risk-taking incentives of bank top managers without exercising direct control
over managerial compensation.
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Appendix A. Valuation of contingent claims
A.1. Equity value in the benchmark case
Let xR be any arbitrary regulatory threshold. Let (τn)n≥1 denote the sequence of asset
expansion dates. Under conjecture that shareholders will raise equity and expand assets
only when the bank asset value attains the regulatory threshold, the cumulated value of
the total shareholders' costs of asset expansions at time t will be given as follows:
It = ((1 + ξ1)zxR + ξ0)
∑
n≥1
1τn≤t, (A1)
where (τn)n≥1 denotes the sequence of asset expansion dates.
Equity value in the absence of the internal agency problem is given by
E(xt) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(δxτ − rD)dτ −
∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)dIτ
]
. (A2)
Solving the corresponding ODE
1/2σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′(x)− rE(x) + δx− rD = 0 (A3)
subject to boundary condition
E(xR) = E((1 + z)xR)− (1 + ξ1)zxR − ξ0 (A4)
yields:
E(x) = νδx−D − Ω(xR, z)xβ2 , (A5)
where ν = (r − µ+ ∆µ)−1, β2 < 0 is the negative root of the characteristic equation
1/2σ2β(β − 1) + (µ−∆µ)β = r, (A6)
and
Ω(xR, z) =
[
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ)zxR
1− (1 + z)β2
]
xR
−β2 > 0. (A7)
A.2. Equity value under the optimal incentive contract
Given the optimal incentive contract defined in Proposition 4, bank equity value follows
EW ∗(xt) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)((δ − w∗1)xτ − rD)dτ −
∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)dIτ
]
, (A8)
where
w∗1 =
b
ν(λ−∆µ) . (A9)
Solving the corresponding ODE
1/2σ2x2E ′′W ∗(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′W ∗(x)− rEW ∗(x) + (δ − w∗1)x− rD = 0 (A10)
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subject to boundary condition
EW ∗(xR) = EW ∗((1 + z)xR)− (1 + ξ1)zxR − ξ0 (A11)
yields:
EW ∗(x) = ν(δ − w∗1)x−D − Ωw(xR, z)xβ2 , (A12)
where
Ωw(xR, z) =
[
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − ν(δ − w∗1))zxR
1− (1 + z)β2
]
xR
−β2 > 0. (A13)
Let W ∗(x) denote the total shareholders' costs of the optimal incentive compensation
contract:
W ∗(x) = w∗1ν
(
x+
zxR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
. (A14)
Then, equity value in the presence of the internal agency problem can be rewritten
as follows:
EW ∗(x) = E(x)−W ∗(x), (A15)
where E(x) is defined by (A5).
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the optimal strategy of bank shareholders when there
is neither the internal agency problem nor capital regulation. Since δ + (µ − ∆µ) < r,
shareholders will never expand bank assets on their own and will close the bank at some
liquidation threshold that maximizes equity value. For any given liquidation threshold
xL, implementing prudent risk management is optimal as long as:
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xL/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x). (B1)
Assume that condition (B1) always holds for any x ≥ xL. Then, bank equity value
would follow:
E(x) = (D − νδxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ νδx−D, (B2)
where β2 < 0 is a negative root of (A6).
The optimal liquidation threshold, x∗L, maximizing equity value, will be given by the
standard formula:
x∗L =
β2
β2 − 1
D
νδ
. (B3)
Then, for x ∈ [x∗L, x∗L/α), the incentive compatibility condition (B1) can be rewritten
as follows:
(λ− β2∆µ) (D − νδx∗L)
(
x
x∗L
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)νδx− λD ≥ 0. (B4)
Note that condition (B4) is binding for x = x∗L. Since the first term on its left-
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hand side is a decreasing and convex function of x, condition (B4) does not hold in the
neighborhood of x∗L. Thus, in the absence of any regulation, sticking forever to prudent
risk management is never optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that asset expansions are prohibitively costly. Con-
sider any regulatory liquidation threshold xL ≥ x∗L. Assume that the bank would stick to
prudent risk management for all x ≥ xL. Then, bank equity value would be defined by
(B2) and, for x ∈ [xL, xL/α), the incentive compatibility condition (B1) can be rewritten
as follows:
(λ− β2∆µ) (D − νδxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)νδx− λD ≥ 0. (B5)
In the case when xL = x∗L, condition (B5) does not hold when x→ x∗L (see the Proof
of Proposition 1). Consider the case when xL > x∗L. Let f(x) denote the left-hand side
of (B5). For all xL > x∗L, it follows that:
lim
x→xL
f(x) = ∆µ(νδ(β2 − 1)xL − β2D) < 0. (B6)
Therefore, any regulatory liquidation threshold xL ≥ x∗L would be unable to prevent
the bank from engaging in tail risk.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the regulatory problem in the case of the owner-
managed bank:
max
xR>0,z>0
E(x0) ≥ 0 s.t.
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) for ∀x ≥ xR,
where x0 > xR and E(x) is given by (A5).
For any expansion factor z > 0, consider a minimum incentive-compatible regulatory
threshold xBR(z) that makes the incentive compatibility condition binding at x = xR:
xBR(z) = h0(z)/h1(z), (B7)
where
h0(z) = (1− (1 + z)β2)λD + ξ0(λ− β2∆µ), (B8)
and
h1(z) = (1− (1 + z)β2)(λ−∆µ)νδ − (1 + ξ1 − νδ)(λ− β2∆µ)z > 0. (B9)
It is shown below that the pair z∗ = arg min Ω(xBR(z), z) and x
B
R(z
∗) is a solution to
the above maximization problem.
Incentive compatibility. For any arbitrary expansion factor z > 0, it must be verified
that xBR(z) ensures the incentive constraint of bank shareholders for all x ≥ xBR(z). Plug-
ging equity value (A5) into the incentive compatibility constraint defined in the region
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[xBR(z), x
B
R(z)/α) yields:
−(λ− β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ)zxBR(z)
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xBR(z)
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)νδx− λD ≥ 0. (B10)
Since the above condition is binding at x = xBR(z) and its left-hand side is increasing with
x, it holds for all x ∈ [xBR(z), xBR(z)/α). For x ≥ xBR(z)/α, the incentive compatibility
constraint of bank shareholders transforms to:
−(λ(1−αβ2)−β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ)zxBR(z)
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xBR(z)
)β2
+(λ(1−α)−∆µ)νδx ≥ 0.
(B11)
To show that condition (B11) holds for any x ≥ xBR(z)/α, I make use of the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 For β2 < 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and ∆µ < λ(1− α), one has λ(1− αβ2)− β2∆µ < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given ∆µ < λ(1 − α) and β2 < 0, it follows that λ(1 − αβ2) −
β2∆µ < λ(1− αβ2)− β2λ(1− α) ≡ f(α). Since f(1) = 0 and f ′(α) = β2λ(1− αβ2−1) > 0
for α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that f(α) < 0 for α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, λ(1− αβ2)− β2∆µ < 0.
By Lemma 1, λ(1− αβ2)− β2∆µ < 0, and ∆µ < λ(1− α) by the initial assumption.
Therefore, (B11) holds for all x ≥ xBR(z)/α.
Feasibility. Note that xBR(z) > 0 if and only if h1(z) > 0, which can be rewritten as the
constraint on the maximum feasible value of the proportional costs of asset expansion:
ξ1 < ξ1(z), (B12)
where
ξ1(z) = νδ
[(
1− (1 + z)β2
z
)(
λ−∆µ
λ− β2∆µ
)
+ 1
]
− 1. (B13)
Now, it must be verified that (i) equity value at the regulatory threshold is strictly
positive, so that it is optimal to raise new equity capital and to expand bank assets at
xBR(s), rather than to prefer regulatory liquidation; (ii) given x
B
R(z), asset expansion at
any x > xBR(z) would be suboptimal.
First, I check that E(xBR(z)) > 0. By using the expression of E(x), one can easily
show that E(xR) > 0 for any xR > x∗R(z), where x
∗
R(z) is a critical asset expansion trigger
such that E(x∗R(z)) = 0:
x∗R(z) =
(1− (1 + z)β2)D + ξ0
(1− (1 + z)β2)νδ − (1 + ξ1 − νδ)z > D. (B14)
By simultaneously multiplying both the numerator and denominator of x∗R(z) by λ,
one may check that xBR(z) > x
∗
R(z). Therefore, E(x
B
R(z)) > 0.
In order to show that asset expansion at any x > xBR(z) would be suboptimal, it
suffices to verify the following condition for x > xBR(z):
E((1 + z)x)− E(x)− (1 + ξ1)zx− ξ0 < 0. (B15)
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Let g(x) denote the left-hand side of the above inequality. Since g′(x) < 0, g′′(x) > 0
and g(xBR(z)) = 0, inequality (B15) holds for ∀x > xBR(z).
Optimality. Since ∂E(x)
∂xR
< 0, the minimum incentive compatible regulatory threshold
xBR(z) is optimal for any given z > 0. Then, the solution of the maximization problem
will be delivered by z∗ = arg max E(x|xBR(z)) ≡ arg min Ω(xBR(z), z).
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume there exists some incentive regulatory threshold
xR, such that shareholders want to promote prudent risk management in their bank for
∀x ≥ xR. Then, the shareholders' maximization problem is reduced to minimization of
the total expected costs of incentive managerial compensation:
min
xT≥xR,w1,w0,RT≥0
SC(xt) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)R(xτ )dτ +
∑
m≥1
e−r(Tm−t)RT
]
s.t.
λW (x) ≥ ∆µxW ′(x) + bx, x ≥ xR, (B16)
where
w1x+ w0 ≥ 0, x ≥ xR, (B17)
and
W (xt) = E
[∫ τ∧τT
t
e−r(τ−t)R(xτ )dτ + e−r(τT−t)RT
]
≥ 0. (B18)
Assume that the manager is provided with the incentives to stick to prudent risk
management. Then, contract continuation value W (x) will follow ODE:
1/2σ2x2W ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xW ′(x)− rW (x) + w1x+ w0 = 0. (B19)
Under the no-bubble condition lim
x→∞
W (x) = w1x + w0, a general solution to (B19) is
given by:
W (x) = C0x
β2 + w1νx+
w0
r
, (B20)
where C0 is any constant defined by the boundary condition at xT .
Consider two alternative cases: xT = xR and xT = ∅.
1) Case 1: xT = xR. Let RT ≥ 0 be any arbitrary terminal payoff. Then, given the
boundary condition W (xR) = RT , the general solution to (B19) can be rewritten as
follows:
W (x) = w1νx+
w0
r
+
(
RT − w1νxR − w0
r
)( x
xR
)β2
. (B21)
The boundary condition for the value of the total shareholders' costs will be given by:
SC(xR) = SC((1 + z)xR) +RT . (B22)
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Then, the shareholders' optimization problem can be rewritten as follows:
min
w0,w1,RT
SCxT=xR(x) =
{
w1νx+
w0
r
+
(
RT + w1νzxR
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xR
)β2}
s.t.
(λ−∆µβ2)
(
RT − w1νxR − w0
r
)( x
xR
)β2
+w1ν(λ−∆µ)x+λw0
r
≥ bx, x ≥ xR, (B23)
w1x+ w0 ≥ 0, x ≥ xR. (B24)
For any w1 and w0, the optimal terminal payoff is given by:
R∗T = w1νxR +
w0
r
. (B25)
Indeed, any RT > R∗T would inefficiently increase SCxT=xR(x), whereas for any RT <
R∗T incentive compatibility condition (B23) cannot be ensured for ∀x ≥ xR.
Given R∗T defined by (B25), incentive constraint (B23) transforms to:
w1ν(λ−∆µ)x+ λw0
r
− bx ≥ 0, x ≥ xR. (B26)
To ensure that (B26) holds for ∀x ≥ xR, the first derivative of the left-hand side of
(B26) must be positive, which reduces the choice of w1 to the subset:
w1 ≥ b
ν(λ−∆µ) ≡ ŵ1. (B27)
For any given w0, the minimum incentive-compatible w1 will be provided by the
binding incentive compatibility condition (B26) evaluated at x = xR. In particular,
w1(w0) = ŵ1 − λ
ν(λ−∆µ)
w0
r
1
xR
. (B28)
Note that w1(w0) ≥ ŵ1 if and only if w0 ≤ 0. Combining this constraint with that
corresponding to the limited liability constraint (B17) yields the following set of feasible
w0:
Θ =
{
w0 ∈
[
− bxR
ν(λ−∆µ)− λ/r , 0
]}
, (B29)
if ∆µ/µ < λ/(r + λ) and
Θ = {w0 ≤ 0}, (B30)
if ∆µ/µ > λ/(r + λ).
Then, the shareholders' cost-minimization problem takes the following form:
min
w0∈Θ
SCxT=xR(x) =
{
w1(w0)νx+
w0
r
+
( w0
r
+ w1(w0)ν(1 + z)xR
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xR
)β2}
,
where w1(w0) is given by (B28).
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Taking the first derivative of SCxT=xR(x) with respect to w0 yields:
∂SCxT=xR(x)
∂w0
=
1
r
1− λλ−∆µ xxR︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
1
(1− (1 + z)β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− λ(1 + z)
λ−∆µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
x
xR
)β2 < 0.
(B31)
Therefore, w∗0 = 0 and w
∗
1 = ŵ1. The total expected costs of incentive managerial
compensation are given by:
SC∗xT=xR(x) = w
∗
1ν
(
x+
(1 + z)xR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
. (B32)
2) Case 2: xT = ∅. Note that, in this case, RT = ∅ and SC(x) = W (x), so that the
shareholders' optimization problem takes the following form:
min
w0,w1
SCxT=∅(x) =
{
w1νx+
w0
r
+
w1νzxR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2}
s.t.
(λ−∆µβ2) w1νzxR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2
+ w1(λ−∆µ)νx+ λw0
r
≥ bx, x ≥ xR, (B33)
w1x+ w0 ≥ 0, x ≥ xR. (B34)
The necessary condition ensuring that (B33) holds for ∀x ≥ xR is equivalent to (B26).
Then, for any given w0, the minimum incentive-compatible w1(w0) will be provided by
(B28). Inserting (B28) into SCxT=∅(x) and taking the first derivative with respect to w0
yields:
∂SCxT=∅(x)
∂w0
=
1
r
1− λλ−∆µ xxR︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− z
(1− (1 + z)β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
λ
λ−∆µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
x
xR
)β2 < 0. (B35)
Hence, as in the Case 1, the solution of the above program will be provided by w∗0 = 0
and w∗1 = ŵ1. The corresponding value of shareholders' costs is given by:
SC∗xT=∅(x) = w
∗
1ν
(
x+
zxR
(1− (1 + z)β2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
≡ W ∗(x). (B36)
Since SC∗xT=∅(x) < SC
∗
xT=xR
(x) for ∀x ≥ xR, the optimal incentive-compatible con-
tract will be defined by the triplet {x∗T = ∅, R∗(x) = w∗1x,R∗T = ∅}. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Given the optimal incentive contract defined by Proposition
4, the regulatory problem in the context of the internal agency problem can be stated as
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follows:
max
xR>0,z>0
EW ∗(x0) ≥ 0 s.t.
λ(EW ∗(x)− 1x≥xR/αEW ∗(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′W ∗(x) +R∗(x) for ∀x ≥ xR,
where x0 > xR and EW ∗(x) is given by (A12).
For any expansion factor z > 0, consider a minimum incentive regulatory threshold
xAR(z) such that the incentive compatibility condition holds for x = xR:
xAR(z) = h0(z)/(h1(z)− w∗1h2(z)) > 0, (B37)
where h0(z), h1(z) are given by (B8), (B9) respectively and
h2(z) = ν((1− (1 + z)β2)(λ−∆µ) + (λ− β2∆µ)z). (B38)
It is shown below that the pair z∗∗ = arg min Ωw(xAR(z), z) and x
A
R(z
∗∗) is a solution
to the above maximization problem.
Incentive compatibility. For any arbitrary expansion factor z > 0, regulatory threshold
xAR(z) must ensure the incentive constraint of bank shareholders for all x ≥ xAR(z). Let
δ∗ = δ−w∗1 > 0.29 Plugging equity value (A12) into the incentive compatibility condition
yields:
−(λ− β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ∗)zxAR(z)
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xAR(z)
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)νδ∗x ≥ λD, (B39)
when x ∈ [xAR(s), xAR(s)/α) and
−(λ(1−αβ2)−β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − νδ∗)zxAR(z)
1− (1 + z)β2
)(
x
xAR(z)
)β2
+(λ(1−α)−∆µ)νδ∗x ≥ 0,
(B40)
when x ≥ xAR(z)/α.
Since condition (B39) is binding at x = xAR(z) and its left-hand side is increasing on
x, it holds for all x ∈ [xAR(z), xAR(z)/α). Condition (B40) holds for all x ≥ xAR(z)/α due
to Lemma 1 and the initial assumption ∆µ < λ(1− α).
Feasibility. Note that xAR(z) > 0 if and only if h1(z) > 0 and h1(z) − w∗1h2(z) >
0. Condition h1(z) > 0 translates into the constraint on the maximum level of the
proportional costs of asset expansion (see (B12) in the proof of Proposition 3). Condition
h1(z) − w∗1h2(z) > 0 translates into the constraint on the maximum value of the size-
adjusted private benefits:
b < b(z, ξ1), (B41)
where
b(z, ξ1) = (λ−∆µ)ν
(
δ − (1 + ξ1)(λ− β2∆µ)z
h2(z)
)
. (B42)
29It is shown below that δ∗ > 0 when the size-adjusted private benefits b are relatively low.
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It is easy to see that condition (B41) implies w∗1 < δ.
It should also be verified that (i) equity value is strictly positive at the regulatory
threshold, i.e., EW ∗(xAR(z)) > 0; (ii) given x
A
R(z), expanding bank assets at any x > x
A
R(z)
would be suboptimal.
To check that EW ∗(xAR(z)) > 0, note that EW ∗(xR) > 0 holds for xR > x
∗∗
R (z), where
x∗∗R (z) is a critical asset expansion trigger such that EW ∗(x
∗∗
R (z)) = 0:
x∗∗R (z) =
(1− (1 + z)β2)D + ξ0
(1− (1 + z)β2)νδ∗ − (1 + ξ1 − νδ∗)z > D, (B43)
where δ∗ ≡ δ − w∗1.
It can be shown that xAR(z) > x
∗∗
R (z), so that EW ∗(x
A
R(z)) > 0.
To be sure that, when faced with xAR(z), shareholders will not undertake asset expan-
sion at any x > xAR(z), it suffices to show that:
EW ∗((1 + z)x)− EW ∗(x)− (1 + ξ1)zx− ξ0 < 0. (B44)
Let gW ∗(x) denote the left-hand side of the above inequality. Since g′W ∗(x) < 0,
g′′W ∗(x) > 0 and gW ∗(x
A
R(z)) = 0, condition (B44) holds for all x > x
A
R(z).
Optimality. Since EW ∗(x) is decreasing with xR, the incentive-compatible regulatory
threshold xAR(z) is optimal for any z > 0. Then, the choice z
∗∗ = arg max EW ∗(x|xAR(z)) ≡
arg min Ωw(x
A
R(z), z) completes the solution to the maximization problem.
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Appendix C. Comparative statics
The five following panels contain comparative statics results illustrating the impact of
the bank's characteristics on the level of the incentive-based capital requirements and
the bank's asset expansion strategy. The first graph in each panel depicts the optimal
incentive regulatory threshold (a solid line) and bank asset value after asset expansion (a
dashed line). The second graph displays the optimal expansion factor. The third graph
shows the pattern of the optimal scale of asset expansion denoted by ∆∗ ≡ z∗xBR(z∗) when
b = 0 or ∆∗∗ ≡ z∗∗xAR(z∗∗) when b > 0. Parameter values common to all comparative
statics scenarios are: D = 1, r = 4%, α = 0.9, µ = 2.5%, ∆µ = 0.5% and δ = 1.9%.
Panel C.1. The impact of the proportional costs of asset expansions
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Panel C.1 illustrates the impact of the proportional costs of asset expansion ξ1 on the optimal asset expansion policy in
the benchmark case, where ξ0 = 0.0001, λ = 0.15, σ = 20%, b = 0.
Panel C.2. The impact of the fixed costs of asset expansions
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Panel C.2 illustrates the impact of the fixed costs of asset expansion ξ0 on the optimal asset expansion policy in the
benchmark case, where ξ1 = 0.05, λ = 0.15, σ = 20%, b = 0.
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Panel C.3. The impact of the asset return volatility
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Panel C.3 illustrates the impact of the asset return volatility σ on the optimal asset expansion policy in the benchmark
case, where ξ0 = 0.0001, ξ1 = 0.05, λ = 0.15, b = 0.
Panel C.4. The impact of loss intensity
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Panel C.4 illustrates the impact of loss intensity λ on the optimal asset expansion policy in the benchmark case, where
ξ0 = 0.0001, ξ1 = 0.05, σ = 20%, b = 0.
Panel C.5. The impact of the internal agency problem
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Panel C.5 illustrates the impact of the size-adjusted private benefits b on the optimal asset expansion policy, where
ξ0 = 0.0001, ξ1 = 0.05, λ = 0.15, σ = 20%.
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Appendix D. Robustness
To test the robustness of the proposed incentive-based capital requirements, I consider
the setting in which issuing equity to insure debt service payments for x < rD/δ involves
proportional costs ϕ ≤ ξ1. First, I verify that incentives for taking on tail risk persist
in the absence of the asset expansion opportunity. Second, I show that, when asset
expansion is feasible, the incentive regulatory threshold triggering asset expansion is still
able to eliminate incentives for engaging in tail risk.30
D.1. Moral hazard in the absence of the possibility of asset ex-
pansions
Assume that asset expansions are prohibitively costly. Let xL denote any given liquidation
threshold imposed by the regulator and let xϕ = rD/δ be a critical threshold, such that
for x ∈ [xL, xϕ) shareholders incur proportional costs ϕ, when issuing equity to service
debt.
Bank shareholders would stick to prudent risk management for all x ≥ xL, if and only
if the following incentive compatibility condition is satisfied for ∀x ≥ xL:
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xL/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x). (B45)
Assume that (B45) holds for ∀x ≥ xL. Then, the value of bank equity is driven by
the system of ODE:
1/2σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′(x)− rE(x) + (1 +ϕ)(δx− rD) = 0, ∀x ∈ [xL, xϕ) (B46)
1/2σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′(x)− rE(x) + δx− rD = 0, ∀x > xϕ (B47)
The general solution of the above system is given as follows:
E(x) = C11x
β1 + C12x
β2 + (1 + ϕ)(νδx−D), ∀x ∈ [xL, xϕ) (B48)
E(x) = C22x
β2 + νδx−D, ∀x ≥ xϕ (B49)
where ν = (r − µ+ ∆µ)−1 and β1 > 0, β2 < 0 are the roots of
1/2σ2β(β − 1) + (µ−∆µ)β = r. (B50)
The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at xϕ, together with the boundary
condition E(xL) = 0, provide:31
C11 =
ϕ
β1 − β2 ((β2 − 1)δνxϕ − β2D)x
−β1
ϕ < 0,
C12 = ((1 + ϕ)(D − δνxL)− C11xβ1L )x−β2L ,
30This robustness check is performed for the benchmark case. It can be easily adapted to the presence
of the internal agency problem by changing δ to δ − w∗1 .
31Given xϕ and ν, it can be shown that C11 < 0.
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C22 = C12 +
ϕ
β1 − β2 ((β1 − 1)δνxϕ − β1D)x
−β2
ϕ .
Then, for x ∈ [xL, xϕ), bank equity value follows:
E(x) = C11(x
β1 − xβ2xβ1−β2L ) + (1 + ϕ)(D − δνxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ (1 + ϕ)(δνx−D). (B51)
The optimal liquidation threshold maximizing equity value, xϕL, will be provided by
the first-order condition, which leads to the following equation:
(β2 − 1)δνxL − β2D = ϕ
1 + ϕ
((β2 − 1)δνxϕ − β2D)
(
xL
xϕ
)β1
. (B52)
A mandatory liquidation threshold imposed by the regulator cannot be lower than
the optimal liquidation threshold chosen by bank shareholders. Thus, consider incentive
compatibility condition (B45) for any xL ≥ xϕL. Given the value of equity defined in
(B51), for x ∈ [xL,min{xL/α, xϕ}), the incentive compatibility condition (B45) can be
rewritten as follows:
C11(x
β1(λ−∆µβ1)− xβ2xβ1−β2L (λ−∆µβ2))+
+ (λ−∆µβ2)(1 + ϕ)(D − δνxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)(1 + ϕ)δνx− (1 + ϕ)λD ≥ 0.
(B53)
Let f(x) denote the left-hand side of (B53). Then, for x→ xL,
lim
x→xL
f(x) = −ϕ∆µ((β2−1)νδxϕ−β2D)
(
xL
xϕ
)β1
+(1+ϕ)∆µ((β2−1)νδxL−β2D). (B54)
Observe that lim
x→xL
f(x) > 0 if and only if
(β2 − 1)νδxL − β2D > ϕ
1 + ϕ
((β2 − 1)νδxϕ − β2D)
(
xL
xϕ
)β1
. (B55)
Let f1(xL) and f2(xL, ϕ) denote the left and the right-hand side of (B55), respectively.
Since f1(xL) and f2(xL, ϕ) are monotonically decreasing with xL, f1(0) > f2(0, ϕ) and
condition (B55) binds for xL = x
ϕ
L, it follows that f1(xL) < f2(xL, ϕ) for any xL > x
ϕ
L.
Therefore, incentive compatibility condition (B45) does not hold in the neighborhood of
∀xL ≥ xϕL. Hence, in the absence of the possibility to comply with capital requirements
via asset expansion, the incentives to take on tail risk persist in the presence of equity
issuance costs (when equity is issued to ensure debt service) and there is no regulatory
threshold that would be able to eliminate them.
D.2. Incentive effect of asset expansions
Now consider the setting in which bank shareholders have the possibility to comply with
minimum capital requirements through asset expansion (realized at reasonable costs) as
long as x ≥ xR. The objective of this section is to show that, even in the presence of
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equity issuance costs related to debt service, the regulatory threshold triggering asset
expansions is still able to eliminate incentives to take on tail risk, i.e., the following
incentive compatibility condition holds for ∀x ≥ xR:
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) for ∀x ≥ xR. (B56)
For the rest of this section, xR stands for the minimum incentive-compatible regulatory
threshold that makes the incentive constraint (B56) binding at x = xR.
Under the possibility of asset expansions, the value of bank equity will be defined by
ODEs (B48) - (B49) solved under the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions at
xϕ, as well as the boundary condition
E(xR) = E(xR + zxR)− (1 + ξ1)zxR − ξ0.
Two cases might be possible when asset expansion is undertaken: (1 + z)xR < xϕ and
(1+z)xR > xϕ. I perform verification of (B56) for the case (1+z)xR < xϕ, which is more
plausible given the modest scale of asset expansion revealed by numerical examples.
Consider two auxiliary functions:
g1(z) = −1− (1 + z)
β1
1− (1 + z)β2 > 0,
g2(z) =
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − (1 + ϕ)δν)zxR
1− (1 + z)β2 > 0.
Bank equity value is given by:
E(x) = C11
(
xβ1 + g1(z)x
β2xβ1−β2R
)
− g2(z)
(
x
xR
)β2
+ (1 + ϕ)(νδx−D), ∀x ∈ [xL, xϕ),
(B57)
E(x) = C22x
β2 + νδx−D, ∀x ≥ xϕ, (B58)
where coefficients C11 and C22 are defined as follows:
C11 =
ϕ
β1 − β2 ((β2 − 1)δνxϕ − β2D)x
−β1
ϕ < 0,
C22 = C11g1(z)x
β1−β2
R − g2(z)x−β2R +
ϕ
β1 − β2 ((β1 − 1)δνxϕ − β1D)x
−β2
ϕ .
Depending on the size of large losses, two alternative cases might be possible: xR/α <
xϕ and xR/α > xϕ.
1) First, consider the setting where xR/α < xϕ. The incentive compatibility condition
(B56) should be verified for the following regions: [xR, xR/α), [xR/α, xϕ) and [xϕ,+∞).
a) For x ∈ [xR, xR/α), incentive compatibility condition (B56) is reduced to:
λE(x) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x). (B59)
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Taking the first derivative of the both parts of (B59) and rearranging the terms yields:
E ′(x)(λ−∆µ) > ∆µxE ′′(x). (B60)
By definition of xR, condition (B59) binds when x = xR. Therefore, to verify that
(B59) holds over [xR, xR/α), it suffices to show that (B60) is satisfied for ∀x ∈ [xR, xR/α),
which is the case if E ′′(x) < 0. Indeed, taking the second derivative of E(x) defined in
(B57) yields:
E ′′(x) = C11︸︷︷︸
x<0
β1(β1 − 1)xβ1−2 + g1(z)β2(β2 − 1)xβ2−2xβ1−β2R︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−β2(β2−1)g2(z)
x2
(
x
xR
)β2
< 0.
b) For x ∈ [xR/α, xϕ), condition(B56) can be rewritten as follows:
C11
(
(λ(1− αβ1)−∆µβ1)xβ1 + g1(z)(λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2)xβ2xβ1−β2R
)
−
− g2(z)(λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2)
(
x
xR
)β2
+ (λ(1− α)−∆µ)(1 + ϕ)νδx > 0.
(B61)
Observe that C11 < 0 and (λ(1 − αβ2) − ∆µβ2) < 0. Then, to ensure (B61), the
following condition should be satisfied for ∀x ∈ [xR/α, xϕ):
(λ(1− αβ1)−∆µβ1)xβ1 + g1(z)(λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2)xβ2xβ1−β2R < 0. (B62)
When (λ(1 − αβ1) − ∆µβ1) < 0, which is the case when α → 0 and λ is relatively
high, (B62) always holds. When (λ(1− αβ1)−∆µβ1) > 0, the left-hand side of (B62) is
increasing with x, so that (B62) holds for ∀x ∈ [xR/α, xϕ) if and only if
g1(z) > −
(
λ(1− αβ1)−∆µβ1
λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2
)(
xϕ
xR
)β1−β2
. (B63)
Lemma 2 Let g1(z) = −1−(1+z)β11−(1+z)β2 , where β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Then, g′1(z) > 0 for
∀z > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Taking the first derivative of g1(z) with respect to z yields
g′1(z) =
β1(1+z)β1−1−β2(1+z)β2−1−(1+z)β1−β2−1(β1−β2)
(1−(1+z)β2 )2 . Observe that g
′
1(z) > 0 if and only if
f1(z) ≡ β1(1 + z)−β2 − β2(1 + z)−β1 − (β1 − β2) > 0. Since f1(0) = 0 and f ′1(z) > 0, then
g′1(z) > 0 for any z > 0.
Since, by Lemma 2, g1(z) monotonically increases with z, condition (B63) holds when
z is not too low.
c) Finally, for x ∈ [xϕ,+∞), condition (B56) can be rewritten as follows:
(λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2)C22xβ2 + (λ(1− α)−∆µ)(1 + ϕ)νδx > 0. (B64)
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The above condition holds for ∀x ∈ [xϕ,+∞) if and only if C22 < 0, which is guaran-
teed by:
g1(z) > −
(
(β1 − 1)δνxϕ − β1D
(β2 − 1)δνxϕ − β2D
)(
xϕ
xR
)β1−β2
. (B65)
Again, since g′1(z) > 0, condition (B65) holds when z is not too low.
2) Now, consider the case where xR/α > xϕ. In this case, incentive condition (B56)
should be verified for the following regions: [xR, xϕ), [xϕ, xR/α) and [xR/α,+∞). It can
be shown that, in each region, condition (B56) is ensured by the concavity of E(x).
Therefore, even in the presence of equity issuance costs incurred by shareholders when
equity is issued to service interest payments on debt, the incentive regulatory threshold
triggering asset expansions is still able to eliminate incentives to take on tail risk.
Appendix E. Endogenous payout(reinvestment) policy
In this Appendix, I build the extended version of the benchmark-case model that allows
for the endogenous payout policy. This additional dimension of the bank shareholders'
policy is introduced by assuming that shareholders have a possibility to reinvest a fraction
Λxtdt of the asset cash-flow,32 where Λ ∈ [0, δ], without incurring any fixed asset adjust-
ment costs. However, reinvestment might involve some proportional deadweight costs,
which is captured by the fact that reinvesting Λxtdt would generate an instantaneous
increase Λ(1− κ)xtdt in the value of assets, where κ ∈ [0, 1).
There are two main questions to be addressed in this framework: (i) what are the im-
plications of the endogenous payout(reinvestment) policy33 on the design of the incentive-
based capital regulation? (ii) whether constraining payouts to shareholders would reduce
the need for tighter capital regulation?34
E.1. Incentive-based capital requirements under the endogenous
payout(reinvestment) policy
The design of the incentive-based regulatory threshold in the extended version of the
model resembles the one presented in Section 4. The sole distinction refers to the fact
that now the regulator should take into account the optimal reinvestment policy of bank
shareholders when selecting the optimal level of incentive-based capital requirements.
32Making the reinvestment rate proportional to the bank asset value helps preserve the Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM) properties of the process describing the dynamics of the bank asset value. The
similar approach to dealing with reinvestment is used by Diamond and He (2014).
33For the rest of the section, the terms "payout policy" and "reinvestment policy" are used inter-
changeably.
34After the recent financial crisis, a number of academic papers (see e.g. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig
and Pfleiderer (2011), Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni and Shin (2011), among others) advocated for imposing
restrictions on dividend payments for the financially distressed banks. Under Basel III, restrictions on
dividend payments were introduced for the banks that fail to maintain capital conservation buffers.
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To define the optimal reinvestment strategy that would be chosen by bank sharehold-
ers, assume that the regulatory threshold xR is set in such a way so as to induce bank
shareholders to stick to prudent risk management. Bank shareholders choose the opti-
mal reinvestment strategy that would maximize the value of their claim. Let it ∈ {0, 1}
denote a binary control variable such that it = 1 reflects the shareholders' decision to
reinvest the fraction Λxtdt of the asset cash-flow. The optimal reinvestment policy is
defined by the solution to the following Bellman equation:
rE(x) = max
i∈{0,1}
{1
2
σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ+ iΛ(1− κ))xE ′(x) + (δ− iΛ)x− rD
}
. (B66)
Under the conjecture that E ′′(x) < 0 (this is verified ex-post), reinvestment is optimal
in the region [xR, x˜], where the reinvestment threshold x˜ is implicitly given by
E ′(x˜) = 1/(1− κ). (B67)
Notice that, when κ is relatively high, reinvestment will be suboptimal and the model
will collapse to the case examined in the Section 4.
The further analysis is conducted under the assumption that the deadweight costs of
reinvestment, κ, are relatively low, so that there exists x˜ > xR. Solving the ODE (B66),
while allowing for the optimal reinvestment strategy and the set of boundary, smooth-
pasting and value-matching conditions, yields the following expressions for the value of
equity in the region [x˜,+∞)35
E(x) = νδx−D − Ω˜(xR, z, x˜)xβ2 , (B68)
where
Ω˜(xR, z, x˜) =
h1(xR, z, x˜) + δ˜ν˜zxR − (1 + ξ1)zxR − ξ0
h2(xR, z, x˜)
, (B69)
h1(xR, z, x˜) =
(δν − δ˜ν˜)x˜
β˜1 − β˜2
[
(β˜1−1)
(xR
x˜
)β˜2(
(1+z)β˜2−1
)
−(β˜2−1)
(xR
x˜
)β˜1(
(1+z)β˜1−1
)]
,
(B70)
h2(xR, z, x˜) =
x˜β2
β˜1 − β˜2
[
(β˜1−β2)
(xR
x˜
)β˜2(
(1+z)β˜2−1
)
−(β˜2−β2)
(xR
x˜
)β˜1(
(1+z)β˜1−1
)]
,
(B71)
with δ˜ = δ − Λ, ν˜ = (r − µ− Λ(1− κ) + ∆µ)−1, and β˜1 > 0, β˜2 < 0 are the roots of the
characteristic equation corresponding to ODE (B66) in the region [xR, x˜].
In the region [xR, x˜], equity value is defined as follows:
E(x) = δ˜ν˜x−D − Ω˜(xR, z, x˜)χ1(x, x˜) + χ2(x, x˜), (B72)
where
χ1(x, x˜) =
x˜β2
β˜1 − β˜2
[
(β˜1 − β2)
(x
x˜
)β˜2 − (β˜2 − β2)(x
x˜
)β˜1]
, (B73)
35It can be shown that Ω˜(xR, z, x˜) > 0, which immediately yields E
′′(x) < 0.
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χ2(x, x˜) =
(δν − δ˜ν˜)x˜
β˜1 − β˜2
[
(β˜1 − 1)
(x
x˜
)β˜2 − (β˜2 − 1)(x
x˜
)β˜1]
. (B74)
To avoid the time consistency problem, the regulatory threshold should be selected
so as to maximize equity value in the region [x˜,+∞). Under this consideration, the
regulatory problem can be stated as follows:
min
xR>0,z>0
Ω˜(xR, z, x˜) s.t. (B75)
λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) for ∀x ≥ xR, (B76)
where x˜ satisfies (B67) and E(x) is defined by (B68) and (B72).
As in the case of the rigid payout policy discussed in Section 4, an appropriate can-
didate for the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold would be xR that makes the
incentive-constraint (B76) binding at x = xR. However, in the current setting, one has to
solve simultaneously for the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold and the optimal
reinvestment threshold, so that proceeding with the analytical verification of the incentive
constraint is not possible. Given that analytic approach to the problem solution turns
out to be sterile, I solve the whole problem numerically in order to get more insights into
the interplay between reinvestment decisions and incentive-based capital regulation.36
Table 1 reports the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold, xBR(x˜), and the
optimal reinvestment threshold, x˜, computed for the different levels of reinvestment rate
Λ and deadweight costs κ. These numerical outcomes highlight three important results
clarifying the interaction between the endogenous reinvestment policy and incentive-based
capital regulation. First, for the same level of deadweight costs, the optimal incentive-
based regulatory threshold declines with the reinvestment rate Λ, since reinvestment at a
higher rate alleviates the moral hazard problem. Second, for a given level of reinvestment
rate Λ, higher deadweight costs of reinvestment, κ, would raise the need for tighter
incentive-based capital regulation. This result can be easily understood in the light of
the fact that taking on tail risk can be seen as an alternative way of increasing the
expected asset growth rate. Higher deadweight costs of reinvestment would make this
alternative more attractive to bank shareholders, so that this effect must be offset by
stricter capital requirements. Finally, one can observe that reinvestment is optimal only
in the close neighborhood of the regulatory threshold. This confirms the intuition that
the shareholders' willingness to reinvest is driven solely by precautionary motives.
E.2. Payout restrictions and risk-taking incentives
The extended version of the model offers an opportunity to investigate the impact of
payout restrictions on the bank's incentives to take on tail risk. Again, to preserve the
GBM properties of the process driving the dynamics of the bank asset value, I model
payout restrictions as the regulatory requirement to reinvest the fraction Λ of the asset
cash-flow when the bank asset value is below some exogenous reinvestment threshold
x > rD/δ. Clearly, such a specification is not ideal for properly dealing with payout
restrictions: it implies only partial reductions of dividend payments in the region [rD/δ˜, x]
36The numerical analysis realized in this section is not intended to provide any quantitative predictions,
but rather serves for the illustration of general patterns.
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Table 1: Regulatory and reinvestment thresholds
κ = 0 κ = 0.02 κ = 0.04
xBR(x˜) x˜ x
B
R(x˜) x˜ x
B
R(x˜) x˜
Λ = 0 1.1912  1.1912  1.1912 
Λ = 0.005 1.1896 1.6146 1.1907 1.4097 1.1912 1.2671
Λ = 0.01 1.1880 1.6007 1.1901 1.4056 1.1911 1.2666
Λ = 0.019 1.1855 1.5781 1.1892 1.3987 1.1910 1.2659
Table 1 reports the values of the optimal incentive-based regulatory thresholds and the associated reinvestment
thresholds computed for different levels of reinvestment rate and deadweight costs of reinvestment. The input
parameter values are: D = 1, r = 4%, σ = 20%, µ = 2.5%, ∆µ = 0.5%, δ = 1.9%, α = 0.9, λ = 0.15,
ξ0 = 0.0001, ξ1 = 0.05.
and requires issuing more equity to maintain the continuity of debt service in the region
[xR, rD/δ˜].37 Nevertheless, even such a rough way of modeling payout restrictions helps
get some insights into the potential impact of this regulatory measure on the risk-taking
incentives of bank shareholders. To illustrate this impact, I numerically compute the
optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold, xBR(x), for a wide range of the mandatory
reinvestment thresholds x.38
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Figure 1: Payout restrictions on the incentive-based capital regulation
This figure depicts the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold as a function of the mandatory reinvestment
threshold x. The input parameter values are: Λ = 0.01, D = 1, r = 4%, σ = 20%, µ = 2.5%, ∆µ = 0.5%,
δ = 1.9%, α = 0.9, λ = 0.15, ξ0 = 0.0001, ξ1 = 0.05.
Figure 1 shows that the optimal incentive-based regulatory threshold xBR(x) is in-
creasing with x. This relation can easily be understood in the light of the fact that
imposing payout restrictions would induce a deviation from the optimal payout policy of
bank shareholders and, thereby, would reduce the value of shareholder's claim, making
37An inventory model, in which the payout policy is contingent on the level of liquid reserves (see e.g.
Decamps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011) or Hugonnier and Morellec (2014)), might be better
suited to this kind of analysis.
38The computation implies solving the regulatory problem (B75) - (B76), in which the optimal rein-
vestment threshold x˜ is substituted by the exogenous reinvestment threshold x.
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shareholders more reluctant to inject capital into the bank upon reaching the regulatory
threshold. Yet, the whole incentive effect of capital regulation in this paper is anchored
to the shareholders' willingness to keep the bank operating upon reaching the regulatory
threshold. In such a context, the upward adjustments of the optimal incentive-based
regulatory threshold are needed in order to offset the adverse effect of payout restrictions
on risk-taking incentives.
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